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Payment for environmental service contracts commonly require actions beyond adoption of a practice, such
as undergoing specified enrollment procedures, granting consent to being monitored, and paying penalties
for violations. These provisions are a bundle of attributes a landholder must accept with contract enrollment,
leading to transaction costs in the contracting process. This article develops a principal-agent framework to
study the links between these transaction costs and the well-known information asymmetries between the
landholders and the government agency offering contracts. Using stated choice data collected from a sample
of farmers, we estimate a mixed logit model to quantify the contribution of different contract attributes on
contract willingness-to-accept (WTA). More stringent provisions in contracts were found to raise individual
WTA by widely differing amounts across farmers, but the average effects imply that overall contract supply
is sensitive to stringency. From a series of microsimulations based on the estimated model, we find that
transaction costs create a significant drain on the cost-effectiveness of contracting from the agency’s point
of view, similar in magnitude to the inefficiency created by hidden information. While stringent contractual
terms raise program expenditures, they may be justified if they raise compliance rates enough to offset the
added cost. We also simulate an implicit frontier to trace out the change in compliance needed to justify
a given increase in stringency. For environmental benefits in the range of previous estimates, this analysis
suggests that stringent terms would need to substantially raise compliance rates to be cost effective.
Key words: contracts, hidden information, microsimulation, mixed logit, payment for environmental ser-
vices, transaction costs
JEL codes: Q58, Q52, Q53
Suggested running head: Transaction costs in environmental contracts
Jeffrey M. Peterson is a professor and the Director of Graduate Studies in the Department of Agricultural Economics at
Kansas State University. Craig M. Smith is an assistant professor in the Department of Agriculture at Fort Hays State
University. John C. Leatherman is a professor, Nathan P. Hendricks is an assistant professor, and John A. (Sean) Fox
is a professor, all in the Department of Agricultural Economics at Kansas State University. The authors are grateful to
AJAE editor Brian Roe and three anonymous reviewers for helpful comments. This research was funded by USEPA’s
Science to Achieve Results (STAR) program through Agreement No. RD-831J77401-0, by USEPA’s Section 319
and Kansas Water Plan funds provided by the Kansas Department of Health and Environment, and by USDA-NIFA
Multistate Project W-2190. Any opinions, findings, conclusions, or recommendations expressed in this publication are
those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the USEPA or the USDA.
1
Payment for environmental services (PES) contracts are a common means of acquiring ecosystem
goods or services from private landholders. Such contracts are becoming more prevalent glob-
ally, with much of the growth coming from environmental markets in developing nations where
PES contracts are a traded instrument (Blackman and Woodward 2010; Pattanayak, Wunder, and
Ferraro 2010). In the United States, PES contracts are used in a number of the major federal
conservation programs in forestry and agriculture (Mercer, Cooley, and Hamilton 2011; Claassen,
Cattaneo, and Johansson 2008), in which a government agency is the sole buyer. In these and many
other PES settings, enrolled landholders receive a payment in exchange for a practice or change in
land use instead of service provision per se, because of the difficulty in measuring environmental
services at small scales.
A large literature has addressed the performance of PES schemes, which can be hindered by
various factors (Wunder, Engel, and Pagiola 2008). PES contracts are executed in a principal-
agent setting, where the buyer of contracts is the principal and the landholder selling a contract is
an agent. Frictions due to information asymmetries arise because agents hold private information
on their individual costs before contracts are signed (Chambers 1992; Ferraro 2008; Fraser 1995;
Latacz-Lohmann and Van der Hamsvoort 1997; Peterson and Boisvert 2004; Spulber 1988; Wu and
Babcock 1996) and on their compliance during the contract period (Choe and Fraser 1999; Fraser
1995; Hart 2005; Ozanne 2001; Ozanne and White 2008). Even with full compliance, practice-
based contracts commonly assume spatially averaged or simulated service provision, which may
not be realized on all contracted sites (Cattaneo 2003). Moreover, some of the enrolled landholders
may have adopted the practice in the absence of contracts, so that some contracts lack “addition-
ality” (Mason and Plantinga 2013; Pattanayak, Wunder, and Ferraro 2010). A recognized but
sparsely studied friction is the transaction cost incurred by contracting parties, which adds social
costs to the realized level of services.
Transaction costs in contracting occur in many forms, including the costs of formulating, ne-
gotiating, and executing contracts, as well as the costs of monitoring and measuring actions during
2
the contract period (Cacho, Marshall, and Milne 2005). While very few studies address PES con-
tracts specifically, there exists an empirical literature on various types of transaction costs borne by
government agencies and farmers in environmental programs (e.g., Falconer, Dupraz, and Whitby
2001a; McCann and Easter 1999; McCann 2009; Vernimmen 2000). This paper focuses on the
transaction costs borne by agents in the PES contracting process and the associated impacts on
aggregate outcomes. Previous studies have simulated the aggregate effects of transaction costs
in PES schemes (e.g., Antle et al. 2007; Netusil and Braden 2001) but because of the paucity of
empirical estimates, they usually model transaction costs as a constant price premium across all
contracts sold. In this paper, we develop estimates of transaction costs that vary across agents,
which allows for a varying premium.
Our estimates are based on a principal-agent framework, which captures the potential links
between transaction costs and information asymmetries. To mitigate against noncompliance or
“moral hazard,” many PES contracts include provisions beyond a commitment to adopt a practice.
Agents often face a detailed enrollment process before signing a contract, and by signing usually
grant their consent to being monitored with penalties assessed for violations (Wunder, Engel, and
Pagiola 2008). We model these provisions as a bundle of attributes an agent must accept with
contract enrollment. More stringent provisions (e.g., increased inspection frequency) raise the
likelihood of contract compliance but at the same time reduce the agent’s utility of enrolling. To
maintain the enrollment of the marginal agent, the principal must add a premium to payments
to cover the transaction costs of the extra stringency. At an aggregate scale, contract stringency
determines both the location and shape the contract supply curve. Heterogeneity across agents
implies an upward sloping supply curve and contract stringency shifts the supply toward higher
prices, although not necessarily in parallel fashion.
Our model also captures the second information asymmetry between the principal and agents.
If agents hold private information on their reservation prices of contracting, the principal can only
offer a uniform contract payment, which implies that at least some agents receive a payment
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exceeding their willingness-to-accept (WTA). These excess payments are known as information
rents, which have been estimated to be a substantial share of payments in many existing programs
(Ferraro 2008).
To fix ideas, we assume that the principal faces an exogenous enrollment target, and that the
program objective is to maximize the net gains from the contracted acreage. Net gains are defined
as environmental benefits, which depend on contract stringency through compliance effects, less
payment expenditures, which are determined from the contract supply. The principal’s problem is
analyzed in two steps, where aggregate payment expenditures are derived as a function of contract
stringency first, and then stringency is chosen by trading off environmental benefits against aggre-
gate payments. A key result from the first step is that contract stringency generally affects both
transaction costs and information rents. This implies that the principal can reduce aggregate ex-
penditures by varying stringency, as an alternative to price discriminating on the basis of individual
WTA. In the second step, we derive the implicit optimal frontier between stringency and contract
compliance, which traces out the minimum change in compliance needed to justify an increase in
stringency.
We apply our model to empirically assess the role of transaction costs in a hypothetical water
quality trading market in Kansas. Our analysis is related to a recent literature that has analyzed
contract enrollment decisions with stated choice data (Christensen et al. 2011; Espinosa-Goded,
Barreiro-Hurlé, and Ruto 2010; Horne 2006; Hudson and Lusk 2004; Ma et al. 2012; Ruto and
Garrod 2009; Vedel, Jacobsen, and Thorsen 2010). Similar to these works, we employ data from
discrete choice experiments with landowners, where contract alternatives included price and non-
price attributes, and we analyze the resulting data with a mixed logit model. We depart from the
existing literature, however, by estimating the full set of correlations among the coefficients in
agents’ utility functions. The estimated correlations are needed to capture the potential nonlinear-
ities of shifts in contract supply.
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We then conduct a series of microsimulations of the estimated model to assess aggregate im-
pacts. With our sample of farmers, we find that transaction costs account for a substantial portion
of total payments, comparable in magnitude to information rents. We also find that the princi-
pal could significantly reduce information rents (as well as transaction costs) by relaxing contract
stringency. In our setting, the simulated compliance frontier suggests that for plausible values of
environmental benefits, very large increases in compliance are necessary to justify even moderate
contract stringency levels.
Conceptual Model
Consider a principal who must set both the terms and prices of PES contracts to be offered to a large
number of heterogeneous agents. A contract is specified by (p,x), where p is the contract payment
for enrolling a fixed amount of land and x = (x1, . . . , xK) is a set of nonprice attributes including
eligibility requirements, noncompliance penalties, monitoring procedures, and other provisions.
Agents may be heterogeneous both with respect to their costs of committing to a contract and
with respect to the environmental benefits from adopting the practice it requires (Ferraro 2003;
Yang, Khanna, and Farnsworth 2005). In general, the principal may have and exploit agent-level
information on both costs and benefits in the contracting process. However, we consider a pure
practice-based program, in which payments are in exchange for practice adoption and do not de-
pend on individual levels of environmental services. This accords with many PES schemes, which
commonly do not attempt to measure the actual benefits provided by each agent (Wunder, Engel,
and Pagiola 2008). Regarding costs, we consider alternative cases where the principal does and
does not exploit agent-level information.
Agents’ Choices
We first consider the agents’ decisions. Each agent n = 1, . . . , N makes a voluntary choice to
enroll in at most one contract and, conditional on enrollment, decides whether to comply with its
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terms. Enrolling in a contract (p,x) will yield an expected utility of
(1) Un(p,x) = max{αnp− cn(x), αnp− vn(x)},
where αn is the agent’s marginal utility of income, cn(x) is the expected disutility of complying
with the contract, and vn(x) is the expected disutility of violating the contract. cn(·) accounts for
the costs of adopting the practice required by the contract as well as the disutility of complying
with the terms in x. vn(·) accounts for the psychic and reputation costs of violation as well as the
expected monetary expenses such as noncompliance penalties. Equation (1) implies that agent n
will comply as long as vn(x) ≥ cn(x). We define the nonprice attributes as stringency-increasing,
where greater stringency implies a higher cost of violating but also a higher cost of complying (i.e.,
∂cn/∂xk ≥ 0 and ∂vn/∂xk ≥ 0 for all k).
To characterize the enrollment decision, the reservation utility of non-enrollment is normalized
to u0 = 0 for all n. The optimized utility of enrolling from equation (1) can be expressed as
Un(p,x) = αnp − φn(x), where φn(x) ≡ min{cn(x), vn(x)} is the cost of the agent’s optimal
compliance/violation choice given the terms x. Enrollment will then be optimal if αnp−φn(x) ≥ 0,
implying a decision rule that we express as
(2) yn(p,x) =

1 if p ≥ φn(x)/αn
0 if p < φn(x)/αn,
where yn = 1 and yn = 0 indicate enrollment and non-enrollment, respectively. The term
φn(x)/αn ≡ WTAn(x) is defined as agent n’s willingness-to-accept or minimum acceptable pay-
ment.
Heterogeneity in preferences across agents leads to a distribution of WTA, which in turn im-
plies that the fraction of agents who enroll varies with contract payments and terms. The rela-
tionship between aggregate enrollment and varying combinations of (p,x) can be regarded as a
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contract supply function. The properties of contract supply can be usefully analyzed with order
statistics.1 Let w(q,x) denote the qth order statistic of the distribution {WTAn(x)}Nn=1. For a given
set of attributes, x, the vector [w(1,x), . . . , w(N,x)] is the set of all agents’ WTA values sorted in
ascending order. We assume that each agent has a distinct WTA, so that the sorted values increase
in a strictly monotone way for all x; i.e., w(1,x) < w(2,x) < · · · < w(N,x).2
The locus of points {(q, w(q,x))} then traces out the contract supply relationship. For simplic-
ity, we assume that each contract enrolls a fixed amount of land (e.g., 100 acres) so the contract
acreage supply is proportional to the contract supply. Note that the supply of environmental ser-
vices depends on the pattern of heterogeneity in environmental benefits from the practice and
compliance with the contract; we return to this issue below. Figure 1 depicts two contract sup-
ply relationships in the special case where WTA is uniformly distributed across a large number of
agents, so that supply is closely approximated by a linear function. The two supply functions in
the figure correspond to two different contractual terms that differ in stringency, x0  x1.
The relative locations of the two supply functions illustrates a general property of order statis-
tics: if WTAn(x1) > WTAn(x0) for all n, then w(q,x1) > w(q,x0) for all q. Intuitively, this
property means that increasing contractual stringency causes the supply relationship to shift to-
ward higher prices. The size of the shift represents the transaction costs borne by agents, in the
sense that increasing stringency from x0 to x1 requires a premium of τ ≡ w(q,x1)−w(q,x0) to be
added to the payment in order to maintain the enrollment of q agents. Figure 1 depicts a case where
this premium is positively correlated with initial WTA; i.e., τ grows as w(q; 0) increases along the
supply locus. In this case w(q,x1) has a steeper slope than w(q; x0). If this premium is negatively
correlated with initial WTA, then w(q,x1) is flatter than w(q; x0). The nature of such correlations
and their effects on the shape of contract supply are empirical questions that we address in our
application below.
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Principal’s Choice of Payments
The principal’s choices can be analyzed in two stages, where nonprice attributes are selected in
the first stage and contract payment levels are set in the second stage. We analyze the problem
by backward induction, starting with the second stage. The second-stage objective is to minimize
aggregate expenditures on payments, conditional on the contract terms (x) set in the first stage,
while meeting a target of enrolling Q ∈ (0, N ] agents. The value of Q is assumed to be known and
exogenous, determined from legislation or other predetermined program goals.3
The structure of the problem depends on the level of the principal’s information on agents’
individual WTA. We consider the polar cases of full information on individual agents and zero
(aggregate only) information. In case of full information, the principal can perfectly price discrim-











where pn is the payment offered to agent n. In the case of zero information, the problem is (3)
with the additional constraint of a uniform price, i.e., p1 = p2 = · · · = pN . By letting p denote the













We denote the solutions to problem (3) by pn(x) (n = 1, . . . , N ) and the solution to (4) by p(x).
We also let einfo(x) and enoinfo(x) denote the optimized value of the objective function, or minimum
payment expenditures, in the cases of full and zero information, respectively.
In the case of full information, the principal will optimally enroll the set of agents with the
lowest WTA to meet the enrollment target. These agents are precisely the group with a WTA at or
below the Qth lowest value in the population, or those meeting the condition WTAn ≤ w(Q,x).
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The principal will optimally offer a price to each such agent following the rule of first-degree price
discrimination. That is, the solution to problem (3) is
(5) pn(x) = WTAn(x) if WTAn(x) ≤ w(Q,x).
For the remaining high-cost agents (those with WTAn > w(Q,x)), the principal may offer any
price strictly below WTA to dissuade them from enrolling. For the example in figure 1 when
contractual terms are x = x0, enrolled agents receive the varying prices along the curve w(q,x0)






which is area D in figure 1 when contract terms are x0 and area B + C +D when they are x1.
In the case of zero information, the optimal solution is a uniform price of p(x) = w(Q,x) to
all agents, implying optimized expenditures of
(7) enoinfo(x) = Qw(Q,x).
For contractual terms of x0, the smallest uniform payment that will enroll Q agents is the value
along the supply curve, w(Q,x0), and the principal’s total expenditures are the area C+D. For the
more stringent terms x1, the uniform payment would need to be increased to w(Q,x1), yielding
total expenditures of A+B + C +D.
We can now define two measures that quantify the response of expenditures to changes in
information and to contract stringency. First, information rents are defined as
r(x) ≡ enoinfo(x)− einfo(x),(8)
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or the reduction in expenditures between the polar cases of zero and full information. Because
information rents arise from a given supply curve, they are a function of the stringency of contracts,
x. For the case of x = x0 in figure 1, going from zero to full information reduces expenditures by
r(x0) = C. Information rents with the more stringent contracts are r(x1) = A.
A second measure quantifies the stringency-induced transaction costs from the principal’s point
of view, holding the level of information fixed. Let
(9) ti(x0,x1) ≡ ei(x1)− ei(x0)
denote the increase in payment expenditures resulting from a change in contract terms from x0
to x1, where i ∈ {info, noinfo} denotes the level of information. In what follows we refer
to this measure as the “additional transaction costs” due to a change in stringency. In the no-
information case in figure 1, raising contract stringency from x0 to x1 raises payment expenditures
from enoinfo(x0) = C+D to enoinfo(x1) = A+B+C+D, implying additional transaction costs of
tnoinfo(x1,x0) =A+B. In the full information case, additional transaction costs are tinfo(x1,x0) =
B + C.
The relationships in figure 1 suggest that correlation patterns between the transaction cost pre-
mium (τ) and the supply curve create a dependency of information rents on contract stringency.
For the case of linear relationships and positive correlation depicted in the figure, an increase in
stringency from x0 to x1 not only generates additional transaction costs, but also changes infor-
mation rents from r(x0) = C to r(x1) = A. As noted above, the positive correlation causes the
supply relationship for x1 to be more steeply sloped than that for x0, which implies thatA > C. For
nonlinear supply relationships, the interaction effects must be resolved empirically. We explicitly
account for this correlation in our analysis below.
The dependence of information rents on stringency has important policy implications. Previous
literature has shown that information rents can be large, but often schemes to price discriminate are
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practically difficult to implement and politically unappealing. If information rents can be reduced
instead by relaxing stringency, the principal has a more politically feasible alternative that also has
the benefit of lowering transaction costs. Of course, one concern with less stringent contracts is
that compliance may decrease. This tradeoff is formalized in the principal’s first-stage problem.
Principal’s Choice of Stringency
In the first stage, the principal sets contract stringency, x, accounting for the changes in payment
expenditures as well as the changes in environmental benefits due to compliance effects. Let bq
(q = 1, . . . , Q) denote the potential environmental benefits obtained from the contracted practice
for the agent in the qth position on the contract supply curve and let λq(x) denote the expected
share of benefits actually obtained given the agent’s compliance effort.4 Total expected environ-
mental benefits among the Q agents enrolled is then B(x) =
∑Q
q=1 bqλq(x) = QE[bqλq(x)]. The
properties of B(x) depends on the joint distribution of bq and λq(x). In particular, the definition of
covariance implies that expected benefits can be written





where b̄ = E[bq] and λ̄(x) = E[λq(x)] are the means of benefits and compliance, respectively,
for those agents that enroll in a contract and σ is the covariance between benefits and compliance.
Compared to the case where b and compliance are uncorrelated (σ = 0), equation (10) reveals
that a positive correlation implies higher expected benefits. This occurs because correlation causes
the farmers with the highest potential environmental benefits to have the largest fraction of their
benefits captured.5 We assume here that the covariance between benefits and compliance is fixed
and does not depend on contract stringency. In the supplementary appendix, we show that results
from the conceptual and empirical models differ little if the covariance is endogenous.
11
Another relevant correlation is that between potential benefits and agents’ WTA along the con-
tract supply curve. This correlation affects the mean of potential benefits among the sub-population
of agents enrolling in contracts, b̄. As the sub-population of agents enrolling are those with the low-
est WTA (figure 1), a positive (negative) correlation between WTA and potential benefits implies
that the mean benefits among enrollees will be relatively low (high) compared to the overall mean.
Thus, the B(x) function will shift downward if the correlation between WTA and b rises.
Using (10), the principal’s first-stage problem with an information level of i can be written
(11) max
x
Q[b̄λ̄(x) + σ]−Qa(x)− ei(x),
where a(x) is the principal’s administrative cost of executing and enforcing a contract with a
stringency of x. The principal’s objective is to maximize environmental benefits, net of of admin-
istrative costs and payment expenditures. In practice, there is considerable uncertainty around the
solution to this problem because little is known about the component functions.6 However, infor-
mation on the expenditure function, which is the empirical focus in this article, can be exploited
to trace out the efficient frontier between stringency and mean compliance. In particular, changing






















where ∆λ̄ = λ̄(x1)− λ̄(x0) and ∆a = a(x1)− a(x0). The expression on the right side of (12) is
a bound on the increase in mean compliance that a change in stringency must achieve. This bound
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is the ratio of the costs of the stringency change, ti(·)/Q+ ∆a, to mean environmental benefits, b̄.
The bound is a declining and convex curve when plotted against environmental benefits.
For some intuition, consider a simple example where an increase in stringency would create
additional transaction costs per enrollee of ti(·)/Q =$30. Initially suppose also that ∆a = 0; i.e.,
contract stringency has no effect on administrative costs. For environmental benefits of b̄ =$100,
the added stringency would need to satisfy ∆λ̄ > 0.3. As transaction costs represent 30% of
potential benefits, an extra 3 out of every 10 farmers need to comply to capture enough new benefits
to offset the new costs. If stringency does affect a, the condition becomes ∆λ̄ ≥ 0.3 + ∆a/b̄. In
the empirical analysis below, we generate points along the frontier in (12) from our estimates of
the ti(·) relations and other parameter values from the literature.
Data
Our data are from choice experiments representing contracting alternatives in a hypothetical water
quality market. Our experiments were framed as a proposed market where municipal wastewater
treatment plants could offset their discharges by buying PES contracts from farmers. Each plant
could offer contractual payments and rules to suit its individual needs, generating a variety of
contract offerings for farmers to consider.
Experimental Design
The attributes of the hypothetical contracts and the levels across which they were varied are in
table 1. The first attribute is represented by the vector of dummy variables z = (FSnohay,FShay,
NTcont,NTrot), where the single element of z equal to one in a given alternative indicates the con-
tracted practice (e.g., z = (0, 0, 1, 0) represents a contract requiring Continuous No-till). FSnohay
and FShay represent two types of filter strips, a grass buffer area along a field edge that slows
runoff and filters out sediments and nutrients. FSnohay is a filter strip that does not allow haying
or grazing on the buffer area, while FShay permits both haying and grazing. NTcont represents
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Continuous No-till, where no soil tillage is permitted for the duration of the contract, and NTrot
indicates Rotational No-till, where tillage is allowed for up to half of the contracted years. These
practices were selected because they are relatively common and are easily understood by farmers,
and are also known to be effective at increasing water quality.7
The remaining attributes are contractual terms. AppTime is the time requirement at contract
initiation to go through the enrollment process; it was varied from 4 to 40 hours to reflect a wide
range of enrollment complexity. InspectPr indicates the share of contract enrollees inspected for
compliance each year, which was either 10% or 100%. Penalty is a one-time fine to be paid if
the farmer is found in violation of a contract, and was varied from $50/acre to $500/acre. Finally,
the Payment attribute was varied from $3/acre/year to $25/acre/year, based on the ranges used by
Cooper and Keim (1996) and Cooper (1997).
Subjects in the experiments were given booklets with a series of choice tasks, each task having
three contract alternatives. For visual consistency and to reduce the number of attributes in our
experimental design, the first alternative in every choice task was a contract requiring installation
of a filter strip, the second was a contract requiring no-till, and the third alternative was a do-not-
enroll option. To facilitate comparison, subjects were told that all contracts had a 10-year duration
and that the field being considered for enrollment was 100 acres in size. In addition, they were
asked to assume that (i) the land quality of the field was representative of their farm, (ii) the most
recent tillage practice was minimum tillage (not no-till or conventional tillage), and (iii) the recent
cropping pattern followed their typical crop rotation.
Prior to data collection, the attribute levels and data collection procedures were refined from
meetings with cooperative Extension staff and a focus group with farmers. To construct the choice
scenarios, we generated an orthogonal main effects design that varied all five attributes across the
two contract alternatives (Adamowicz, Louviere, and Williams 1994). The smallest such design
contained 32 scenarios, which were blocked into two sets of 16, giving us two versions of the
experiment that were randomly assigned across subjects.
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Sample Characteristics
Data were gathered from groups of farmers attending Extension meetings at four locations in
Kansas. Subjects were recruited at each meeting via a pre-registration mailing and an announce-
ment at the opening conference session. The choice experiment itself was then conducted during
a 1-hour session, typically scheduled with the help of the meeting organizers as a parallel session
in a one-day program. Data were collected from 135 subjects across the four locations, provid-
ing a total of 2,177 usable choice observations.8 Additional details on data collection are in the
supplementary appendix.
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for the sample. The average responses to the choice
scenarios in the top panel of the table indicate the choices were fairly balanced across the three
alternatives in each choice set. Among all choice observations in the sample, a filter strip alternative
was chosen 39% of the time, a no-till alternative 34% of the time, and the do-not-enroll alternative
27% of the time.
The bottom panel gives summary statistics of the respondents and their operations. The farmers
in our sample have an average farm size of over 1,600 acres, which is larger than the averages
reported in the 2007 Census of Agriculture (USDA 2009) for all Kansas farms (707 acres) and for
all US farms (418 acres). Census data, however, include a large number of very small operations.
Over 32 percent of Kansas farms in the 2007 Census were smaller than 100 acres, which would not
be of sufficient scale to participate in the PES contracts considered here. The average Kansas farm
in the 2007 Census is 1,322 and 1,543 acres for the sub-populations with sizes of at least 100 and
200 acres, respectively. Our average subject is actually about 400 acres smaller than the average
farm in the Kansas Farm Management Association, an entity with 1,543 farm members providing
data that are frequently used for policy analysis. Thus, while our sample is not representative of
all farm sizes, it likely better represents those for which such contracts are feasible.
Because our sample was drawn from attendees at Extension conferences, deviations in operator
characteristics from state state averages are not surprising. At 41.5 years, our average respondent is
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younger than the state census average of 57.7 years. 58% of our respondents indicated that farming
is their primary occupation, compared to 47% of farmers in the state census data. Education lev-
els are not reported in the Census of Agriculture, but USDA Agricultural Resource Management
(ARMS) survey data (USDA-ERS 2011) indicates that 66% of US farm operators have at least
a high-school level education and 25% have a college degree. Compared to these statistics our
sample of farmers have substantially more education, with 100% and 64.9% having high school
and college diplomas, respectively. Our sample also has more experience with conservation pro-
grams, with 45% having participated in the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) and 30% in the
Environmental Quality Improvement Program (EQIP), compared to 16% of ARMS respondents
receiving conservation program payments.
The nature of our sample then, may have implications for the extent to which results are gen-
eralizable to a broader population. The transaction cost measurement literature suggests that our
sample will produce an under-estimate of the transaction costs incurred by the average farmer.
Education reduces information processing costs (Huffman 1974), thereby lowering the cost of
identifying and enrolling in government programs (Falconer 2000; McCann 2009; Mettepennin-
gen et al. 2007). Full time farmers are expected to incur lower transaction costs relative to part-time
operators, who must divide their available time between off farm employment, farm operation, and
administrative tasks such as program enrollment (McCann 2009). Finally, transaction costs of
enrollment in programs has been found to have a strong learning-by-doing effect (McCann et al.
2005; Mettepenningen et al. 2007), implying that farmers who have enrolled in similar programs
previously incur lower transaction costs from future enrollment. Overall, the characteristics of our




Our econometric analysis is built on a random utility framework. Let Cs denote the set of alterna-
tives in choice scenario s = 1, . . . , 16. In our empirical specification of equation (1), subject n’s
utility from choosing contract alternative j ∈ Cs in choice scenario s is Unj = Vnj + εj , where Vnj
is the nonrandom portion of utility that can be modeled as a function of observed factors and εj is
a random term representing unobserved factors. The modeled portion of utility is specified as





where zj = (FSnohayj,FShayj,NTcontj,NTrotj) indicates the contracted practice, xj = (AppTimej,
Epenj,Annualj) is a vector of nonprice attributes, and θn ≡ (αn,γn,βn) are the utility coefficients
to be estimated. The first element of xj (AppTime) is taken directly from the choice experiments
(table 1), while the remaining two are derived attributes. The second element is the interaction be-
tween inspection frequency and the penalty: Epen = InspectPr× Penalty, or the expected penalty
to be paid conditional on violating the contract. The third element, Annual, is a binary variable
capturing the independent effect of increased inspections, where Annual = 1 if InspectPr = 1 (“an-
nual monitoring”) and Annual = 0 otherwise. These derived attributes allow us to separate two
conceptually distinct effects of inspection probability on enrollment. To identify the parameters of
the model we impose the normalization restriction that Vnj = 0 for the do-not-enroll alternative.
In sum, our empirical specification of utility captures the disutility of enrollment (φn(·) in the con-
ceptual section) through the terms γ ′nzj +β
′
nxj . The elements of γ are practice-specific constants,
while the elements of β represent the marginal utility of contract attributes.9
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Derived Estimates
Given estimates of the utility coefficients, θ̂n, we can derive estimates of several other variables of
interest. First, a point estimate of agent n’s WTA for a particular contract is
(14) WTAn = −





The change in WTA in response to a change in the kth attribute in x, or the marginal willingness-







MWTA measures the separate effect of each contract attribute on enrollment costs. The MWTA
for each of the binary elements of z is −γ̂nl/α̂n, which can be interpreted as agent n’s expected
cost of committing to the lth practice.
Under particular assumptions, the MWTA for expected penalties has a further interpretation as
an indicator of an agent’s compliance intentions. Let λn denote agent n’s subjective probability of
complying with a contract if he/she were to enroll, which is assumed to differ across individuals
but to remain constant across practices (z) and contractual terms (x) for each individual. A $1
increase in Epen then imposes a cost of $1 on an agent in the state of the world where the agent
violates the contract (occurring with probability 1 − λn), and has a cost of zero otherwise, for an
expected cost of $(1−λn). If agent n is risk neutral, then MWTAn,Epen = 1−λn or n’s subjective
probability of violating contracts. If the agent is risk averse, then MWTAn,Epen is an upper-bound
estimate of the subjective violation probability. A complete derivation of these results is in the
supplementary appendix.
It should be noted, however, that the assumption of fixed individual compliance rates is restric-
tive because it holds a farmer’s compliance probability constant across across practices and across
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different stringency levels. Compliance may differ across practices because tillage and the width
of a filter strip would be easy to monitor, but grazing a filter strip may be difficult to detect in a
late-season inspection. Further, the probability of complying may rise if penalties or the inspection
frequency increase. Given the structure of our data, we cannot identify the parameters of a function
λn(z,x), separately from the utility coefficients, β. Although our derived estimate of λn cannot
capture within-subject variation in compliance, it does capture the cross-sectional heterogeneity
in farmers’ ex ante uncertainty about their ability to comply, such as prior experience with the
practice or uncertainty regarding future constraints on production (Vedel, Jacobsen, and Thorsen
2010).
Mixed Logit Specification
The utility coefficients were estimated with a mixed logit (MXL) model (Train 1998, 2003). The
MXL model is one of the most general approaches to capture preference heterogeneity, in which
coefficients are allowed to vary across subjects following a specified distribution. A limitation of
the MXL model is that the researcher must specify a form for the coefficient distribution based on
little guidance from theory. Here, our base specification is the multivariate normal distribution, i.e.,
θ ∼ MVN(µ,Σ) where µ is the mean vector of the coefficients and Σ is the covariance matrix.
We specify the most general form of this distribution allowing for all pairwise correlations among
the coefficients. While these correlations complicate estimation, they are relevant here because
they may affect the shape of contract supply.
Although a common choice in applications of the MXL model, the normal distribution imposes
a symmetric shape on the coefficient distribution and has unbounded support. These assumptions
may not be valid for all coefficients. For example, the marginal utility of income (αn) is expected
to be bounded above zero for all agents. In addition, we might expect this (and other) coefficient
distributions to be skewed if there are clusters of values near zero and a number of outliers spread
over a long tail on one side of zero. As a robustness check, we also estimated the model where
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the coefficients with a theoretically expected sign were distributed lognormally while those with
unrestricted signs were distributed normally (see the supplementary appendix). The distributional
assumptions make little difference to our main conclusions, so we only present results here for the
model with all coefficients normally distributed.
Estimation procedures for the MXL model are described by Train (2003) and Greene (2007).
The model derives its name from the ‘mixing’ of the coefficient distribution in estimation with the
utility error, εj , which is assumed to follow an extreme-value type I distribution. The likelihood
that a subject’s utility is maximized under their observed choices then has a known form but must
be integrated over the mixing distribution using simulation or other methods (Train 2003, p. 148-
151). We employed the maximum simulated likelihood method with NLOGIT 4.0 Greene (2007),
with 150 draws taken from the coefficient distribution in each iteration. Coefficients are specified
to vary across individuals but are fixed for a given individual across all choice scenarios.
Estimation Results
The estimated means and dispersions (standard deviations) of the utility coefficients from the base
model are reported in table 3. Nearly all of these parameters were estimated with high statistical
significance, evidence that the coefficient distributions are centered away from zero and also vary
across individuals. The magnitudes of the estimates are difficult to interpret directly as they are
measured in utility units. To aid in interpretation, the last column of the table reports the implied
marginal WTA of each variable at the estimated means of the coefficients. The next section presents
a more comprehensive analysis of the implied WTA distributions.
The estimated coefficient means have signs consistent with theory and previous studies. The
mean subject is estimated to incur disutility from committing to a practice (γ̂  0). The MWTA
associated with the practice dummies represents the average farmer’s perceived commitment costs,
which range from $1.45/acre to $9.43/acre across the four practices. The estimated cost of com-
mitting to less restrictive versions of the practices are smaller; filter strips are less costly when
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haying and grazing is allowed, and no-till is less costly when it can be adopted on a rotational
basis. Consistent with previous findings (Broch and Vedel 2010; Espinosa-Goded, Barreiro-Hurlé,
and Ruto 2010), these differences indicate that greater flexibility reduces agents’ opportunity costs
of committing to a practice.
The estimated mean of the coefficient on AppTime implies that the average farmer would need
about $0.20/acre in additional annual income to be compensated for an extra hour of application
time at contract inception. Given that a contract would enroll a 100-acre field and the payments
would be received annually over a 10-year period, this estimate translates to an hourly compensa-
tion of about $150/hour assuming the farmer discounts the income stream at a rate of 0.05. This
value seems large, but may partly reflect landowners’ expectation of reporting requirements during
the contract period if the enrollment process is complex, along with a strong aversion to paperwork.
The estimated mean coefficient for Epen implies a MWTA of about $0.015/acre per dollar of
expected penalties. As discussed above, under particular assumptions this result means that the
average landowner places at most a 1.5% probability on violating contractual terms. This estimate
is somewhat lower than the observed noncompliance rates in existing programs. Both citing USDA
datasets, Cattaneo (2003) reported that 11% of the contracted practices in the EQIP program during
the period 1997-2000 were not fulfilled, while Giannakas and Kaplan (2005) reported that 4% of
audited farmers receiving commodity payments in 1997 did not fulfill conservation compliance
requirements. However, our estimate represents a farmer’s subjective probability formed prior to
enrollment, which may be influenced by psychological factors such as overconfidence in one’s
future performance or the desire to punish violators. Overconfidence has been found to be more
prevalent among males (Estes and Hosseini 1988; Bhandari and Deaves 2006), who comprise the
vast majority of our sample.
Finally, the negative MWTA of Annual implies that, holding all other attributes constant in-
cluding expected penalties, the average subject prefers annual monitoring over a 10% spot check
system. However, this interpretation assumes that all other regressors are constant, which implies
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that a change from a spot-check to an annual monitoring system would be accompanied by a 10-
fold decrease in the Penalty variable to keep Epen unchanged. If instead Penalty is held constant,
then the MWTA of Annual at mean coefficients is −(β̂3 + 0.9× β̂2 × Penalty)/α̂.10 This value is
negative when Penalty is less than $204 but becomes positive for larger penalties, reaching a value
of $4.08 at Penalty = 500, the maximum of that attribute in the choice experiments. These results
are consistent with recent research suggesting that agents perceive both benefits and costs from
monitoring of their actions, so that net benefits may differ in sign across different situations. 11
While the means of the distributions generally conform with expectations, most of the coeffi-
cients have relatively large estimated dispersions, implying that a non-trivial share of individuals
are estimated to have coefficients with the opposing sign as the mean. The implied percentage
of subjects with negative coefficients are reported in the second-to-last column of table 3. As
discussed above, these patterns may arise partly from the unbounded support of the normal distri-
bution. Another potential data problem is that preferences of a given subject may not remain stable
as they complete a sequence of 16 choice tasks due to learning and/or fatigue effects (Savage and
Waldman 2008). We ran alternative models that address both these issues, and found that our main
findings were robust across models (see supplementary appendix).
The estimated correlation coefficients in table 4 reveal a number of important patterns.12 The
practice specific constants are positively correlated with each other, indicating that farmers who
can adopt one practice at low cost can also adopt other practices at low cost. The coefficient on
Epen (β2) is positively correlated with all the practice constants, which, consistent with intuition,
suggests that farmers who have a low subjective probability of violating a contract are also low-cost
adopters. Also consistent with intuition, the correlation between the coefficients of Payment (α)
and AppTime (β1) is negative and significant, indicating that farmers with a high marginal utility
of income also have a high disutility of enrollment time.
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Contract Simulations
We conducted a series of microsimulations to quantify the market-level effects implied by our
econometric estimates. Our simulations are numerical implementations of our conceptual model,
yielding predicted points on the surface of the expenditure function ei(x), from which we can
generate estimates of information rents and additional transaction costs. The statistical uncertainty
around each point is quantified with Monte Carlo methods.
Each simulation predicts outcomes for contracts requiring a single practice. We ran two sim-
ulations, one for Continuous No-till contracts and the other for Filter Strip (no haying/grazing)
contracts. These simulations are sufficient to capture the differences across practice types, as the
two additional practices in our choice experiments are more flexible (and hence lower cost) ver-
sions of the simulated ones.
Costs and Contract Payments
We first simulated the outcomes in the second stage of the principal’s problem, in which contract
payments are set given contract supply relations, a fixed enrollment target, and a specified level of
contract stringency. The inputs for each simulation include the following elements:
• The estimation results from the MXL model. These include the estimated coefficient means,
µ̂, and covariance matrix, Σ̂, that reflect the pattern of preference heterogeneity across
agents. In addition, to simulate the confidence intervals around the final outputs, the model
requires estimates of the sampling variance around these point estimates. Letting δ̂ =
vec(µ̂, Σ̂) denote the full set of (vectorized) parameters estimated, the simulations also use
the matrix V = v̂ar(δ̂), the maximum likelihood estimate of the sampling covariances sur-
rounding the estimated parameters.
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• The enrollment target,Q. The simulation model inputs this target as the proportion ȳ ∈ [0, 1]
of agents to be enrolled (i.e., Q = ȳN ). We specified a target of ȳ = 0.5, which implies that
the last agent enrolled has median preferences.
• The stringency level(s) of the contract. To be able to trace out a frontier for the first stage
decision, we simulated four stringency levels represented by the attribute profiles, x, in table
5. The first profile represents a base case where all attributes are set at the minimum val-
ues in the choice experiments, while the remaining profiles are intended to represent “low,”
“medium,” and “high” stringency levels based on the range of estimates from the literature.13
The simulation follows a nested Monte-Carlo method based on Hu, Veeman, and Adamow-
icz (2005). An ‘inner’ algorithm captures the variation in agent’s costs and enrollment actions
due to preference heterogeneity, while an ‘outer’ loop quantifies the statistical uncertainty in the
inner simulation results.14 In the inner loop, a sequence of independent draws,
{
θ̂1, . . . , θ̂N
}
, is
taken from a MVN(µ̂, Σ̂) distribution, where each draw θ̂n represents the utility coefficients of
an agent. For each agent, WTAn is calculated for each of the four x profiles using equation (14).
The WTAn’s are then sorted in ascending order for each x, generating the family of supply rela-
tionships in panels (a) and (b) of figure 2. For each supply curve, expenditures under full and zero
information are calculated from equations (6) and (7), yielding the results in panels (c) and (d).
Finally, information rents and additional transaction costs are calculated from (8) and (9), shown
in panels (e) and (f). The simulation results are the empirical equivalents of the theoretical areas in
figure 1, where areas are calculated as numerical integrals.
The ‘outer’ loop runs m = 1, . . . ,M iterations of the inner algorithm, each time perturbing the
MVN(µ̂, Σ̂) coefficient distribution with an error drawn from V. In effect, payments are simu-
lated for M agent populations, each of which has a slightly different distribution of preferences
over its N members. We set M = N = 10, 000 in both simulations. The bar heights in the middle
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and bottom panels of figure 2 are the means of the output across the M perturbations, while the
error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
Panels (a) and (b) of figure 2 reveal that contract stringency has both first-order and second-
order effects on contract supply. The first order effect is that more stringent contracts shift the
supply relationship toward higher prices, as expected. Although the attributes of more stringent
contracts are not costly for all agents (table 3), the bulk of agents face higher costs, resulting in an
upward shift. The second order effect is a reduction in supply elasticity - i.e., the supply curves
become more steeply sloped as contracts become more stringent.
The results in panels (c)-(f) of figure 2 decompose the payments needed to enroll half of the
agents in the respective practice. As explained in the conceptual section, information rents are the
difference between simulated expenditures at zero and full information, while additional transac-
tion costs are the difference between expenditures at a given stringency and those at Minimum
stringency. At each stringency level, the heights of the two bars in panels (e) and (f) represent the
potential reduction in payment expenditures from either (i) eliminating information rents by using
individual WTA information to price discriminate or (ii) reducing additional transaction costs by
reducing contract stringency to the Minimum level. The additional transaction costs assume zero
information, which we take to be the policy-relevant baseline.
Consistent with previous findings, simulated information rents were large in proportion to total
payments in each scenario, ranging from 64% and 78% of zero-information payments. Thus, a
potentially large fraction of payment expenditures could be avoided through the collection and use
of information. We find here that additional transaction costs are of a comparably large magnitude,
although they naturally depend on the assumed level of stringency. At Low stringency, additional
transaction costs represent 18% and 32% of zero-information payments for the No-till and Filter
Strip contracts, respectively, while at High stringency they account for 52% and 69% of initial
payments for those contracts.
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From a baseline of highly stringent contracts and zero information, the principal has a similar
scope to reduce payments through changes in contract design as through collecting information.
Moreover, relaxing contract stringency reduces information rents as well as transaction costs. For
example, by relaxing stringency of Filter Strip contracts from High to Low, information rents
decline from $8.72 to $4.55 per enrolled acre (while at the same time transaction costs decline
from $9.36 to $1.94 per enrolled acre). This interaction does not hold in general, but arises in our
setting because of the estimated second-order effects of stringency as described above.
Compliance Frontiers
Even if stringent contracts result in larger payments, the principal may still prefer greater stringency
if it raises environmental benefits through greater compliance. To quantify this effect, we simulated
the results of the principal’s first-stage problem, finding points along the frontier in equation (12).
The value of ti(x0,x1)/Q in (12) was set at the simulated (zero-information) additional transaction
costs in panels (e) and (f) of figure 2, while b̄was varied across a range of values based on estimates
from the literature.15 As b̄ is the mean potential benefit among enrolled (i.e., low-WTA) agents, the
varying levels of this parameter represent different correlations between potential environmental
benefits and WTA, with smaller (larger) values of b̄ corresponding to positive (negative) WTA-
benefit correlations.
Another parameter in (12) is the change in administrative costs. While substantial evidence
exists that environmental programs involving many landholders are administratively costly (Mc-
Cann and Easter 1999; Falconer, Dupraz, and Whitby 2001b; Wunder, Engel, and Pagiola 2008),
we were unable to find quantitative estimates of the change in costs from the type of contract strin-
gency changes modeled here. We set ∆a = 0 in our simulations, which generates frontiers with
the lowest possible change in compliance needed for a given stringency change. The resulting
frontiers, in figure 3, should thus be interpreted as lower bounds.
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Figure 3 shows the simulated frontiers only for No-till contracts, with each curve representing a
change in stringency from Minimum to an alternative level. Results for the Filter Strip contracts are
not shown as they are nearly identical, except that the likely range of benefits would not include
values above $30/acre. As described in the conceptual section, these frontiers also assume that
the covariance between environmental benefits and compliance is fixed and does not depend on
stringency. In the supplementary appendix, we develop a simulation framework where covariance
is endogenous but find that our main results change little.
The frontiers reveal that highly stringent contracts must be very effective at raising compliance
to be justified, particularly when mean benefits are low. For example, if environmental benefits
are $10/acre (which is slightly above the current reimbursement rates paid by the EQIP program
in Kansas), then raising stringency from Minimum to Low, Medium, and High stringency raises
net benefits if it improves compliance rates by at least 20, 55, and 94 percentage points, respec-
tively. Even if environmental benefits are $20/acre, then raising stringency from Minimum to Low,
Medium, and High stringency must increase compliance rates by at least 10, 27, and 47 percentage
points.
Conclusions
This article has identified the role of transaction costs in PES contracts that arise from stringency
in nonprice contractual terms. Transaction costs may coexist with information rents, which arise
from landowners’ private information on their own costs of committing to a contract. In our em-
pirical analysis, we find that additional transaction costs from increased contract stringency are of
comparable magnitude to information rents. We do not, however, estimate the cost of actually col-
lecting the WTA information in order to price discriminate, which would partly offset the payment
savings represented by information rents. The substantive role of stringency-induced transaction
costs suggests that careful attention to contractual provisions is warranted in the design of PES
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programs and markets. Transaction costs may partly explain the low participation rates observed
in many environmental markets.
While much literature has devised methods, such as auctions or mechanism design, to reduce
payments by inducing agents to voluntarily reveal WTA information, our findings suggest that re-
laxing contractual stringency is an alternative payment-reducing strategy. For the case studied here,
less stringent contracts not only reduce transaction costs but also substantially reduce information
rents. This interaction may not hold in general but is linked to the positive correlations between
agents’ costs of committing to practices and their costs of dealing with stringent contractual terms.
Of course, a primary disadvantage of relaxing stringency is that environmental benefits may
be sacrificed if contract compliance rates fall. We show how the estimates of stringency-induced
transaction costs can illuminate the tradeoff between reduced payments and reduced environmental
benefits from lost compliance. For the case studied here, highly stringent contractual provisions
would be preferred only if those provisions have strong effects on compliance or if the benefits of
practices are very high.
A limitation of our empirical analysis is that our choice data are based on hypothetical re-
sponses from a non-random sample of farmers, which may limit the generalizability of our find-
ings. However, there are a number of reasons to believe that the transaction costs incurred by
representative farmers would be even larger than our estimates. First, to the extent that our sub-
jects are not representative of the population, the transaction cost measurement literature suggests
that costs of stringent contractual terms in our sample would be below average. Moreover, if our
subjects exhibited social desirability bias in favor of enrolling, or were over-confident in their abil-
ity to benefit from hypothetical contracts, our estimated costs would lie below their actual costs.
Our focus here is on practice-based contracting, where the principal seeks to maximize ex-
pected environmental benefits, net of administrative and payments costs, from practices adopted
on a fixed acreage. The contribution of such programs to social welfare depends on the correlation
between benefits and WTA (Yang, Khanna, and Farnsworth 2005; Ferraro 2003). In particular, a
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positive correlation may imply that the low-WTA agents with the greatest incentive to enroll also
provide the lowest benefits, thus reducing the welfare gain. As our framework already accounts for
the benefit-WTA correlation, a natural extension would be to model a performance-based program
where contracts are denominated in environmental services provided. Empirical analysis of such a
setting, however, would require site-specific data on environmental benefits of practice adoption.
Our analysis suggests ways that contracts should be designed to be maximally effective. Con-
tractual terms should be designed to balance the objectives of keeping transaction costs and admin-
istrative costs low while raising the incentives to comply. Perhaps because of the potentially high
costs of appeals and litigation, USDA has a relatively low frequency of inspecting and auditing
contracts, and has often declined to extract penalties when noncompliance is discovered (Catta-
neo 2003; Claassen, Cattaneo, and Johansson 2008). Instead, they have focused on an enrollment
process that clearly documents the feasibility of a practice. While these procedures may improve
compliance rates, our results suggest that they also may raise transaction costs, as farmers are
found to be very averse to enrollment time but would be less averse to frequent inspection or mod-
erate penalties. Our framework can be applied to quantify transaction costs and the most effective
contract designs using new data on different contracting schemes.
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Notes
1Let the set S denote a sample containing N values. The qth order statistic in this sample, s(q), is the qth-lowest
value in the set S, such that s(1) ≤ s(2) ≤ · · · ≤ s(N).
2This assumption does not have meaningful impacts on our results, but rules out the possibility of flat spots along
the supply relationship that would lead to indeterminacies in the quantity of contracts supplied.
3As one example, the Conservation Reserve Program has a statutory cap on enrolled acreage.
4If compliance is binary, then λq(x) represents the probability that the agent complies with the contractual re-
quirements. More generally it captures the degree or rigor of compliance (e.g., the attention paid to seeding and
maintenance of a filter strip), such that greater rigor captures a greater share of potential benefits.
5As a simple example, suppose that half of the enrolled agents have potential environmental benefits of b = 0,
while for the other half b =$100. If the compliance rate is uncorrelated with benefits with a mean of λ̄ =0.7, then
the expected total benefits captured is B = Q2 (0)λ̄+
Q
2 (100)λ̄ = 0.35Q. However, if compliance is correlated with b
such that the conditional mean of compliance is λ̄0 = 0.5 in the zero-benefits group and λ̄1 = 0.9 in the high-benefits
group, then total benefits are B = Q2 (0)λ̄
0 + Q2 (100)λ̄
1 = 0.45Q.
6This problem is not identical to maximizing restricted social welfare (where the restriction reflects enrollment
of Q agents), but its components can be interpreted in welfare terms. In particular, if known, the first term in (11)
accurately captures social benefits, but in the case of zero information the second term over-estimates social costs
because the portion of payments reflecting information rents is simply a transfer from the principal to agents. If full
information is the starting point, however, the objective in (11) is equivalent to restricted welfare. In sum, the results
from (11) misrepresent welfare under zero information, but the maximum error is represented by information rents.
7Filter strips have varying configurations and sizes. To maintain consistency in the experiment, we specified the
filter strip as comprising 4 acres of the 100 acre field. Further, to make filter strips comparable to no-till, which
may be implemented at zero or negative costs for many farmers, subjects were told to assume that they would be
fully compensated for all installation, maintenance, and land rent costs on those 4 acres. The payment would then
be compensation for the transaction costs of the contract plus the cost of managing the filter strip (avoiding use as a
roadway, repairing and reseeding any eroded areas), and again for consistency with the no-till contract, the payment
would be received on a per acre basis for all 100 acres.
8While our sample is small compared to numbers attainable with survey methods, the number of participants is
similar to that of other studies using high-level subject interaction in laboratory experiments or personal interviews.
For example, Defrancesco et al. (2008) used personal interviews with 139 farmers in Northern Italy to investigate
participation in environmental programs.
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9Although we have some data on individual characteristics (table 2), we do not attempt to estimate their impact
on utility. Our research objectives here only require estimation of the pattern of heterogeneity; the causes underlying
these patterns is a substantive research question but lies outside the scope of this paper. A reviewer also correctly notes
that our normalization of zero utility for the do-not-enroll option does not allow us to estimate the preference for or
against enrollment separately from the practice constants and attribute coefficients. For example, if subjects prefer
to enroll in contracts regardless of the practice or contract attributes, this preference would be confounded with the
estimated parameters. Because of the construction of our experiments, however, we cannot specify a model to identify
the enrollment preference as a distinct effect.
10This expression is obtained as the difference between estimated WTA (equation (14)) at Annual = 1 and Annual =
0, holding Penalty and all other variables constant.
11For PES contracts, an agent’s cost would include the opportunity cost of time and administrative costs during
additional monitoring visits, in addition to disutility from viewing monitoring as intrusive or as a signal of mistrust.
Benefits would be perceived by farmers with socially-oriented preferences, who may regard monitoring as a means to
uphold social norms of fairness (e.g., Nyborg 2000) or as supporting conscientious behavior (e.g., Frey and Jegen
2001). Our results suggest that the average farmer’s benefits outweigh his costs if penalties are low, but the reverse is
true when penalties are high.
12While not all correlation coefficients are statistically different from zero, we reject the null hypothesis uncorrelated
coefficients at the 99% percent level of confidence.
13McCann (2009) found that livestock producers in Iowa and Missouri spend an average of 16.6 hours developing
comprehensive nutrient management plans. Fang, Easter, and Brezonik (2005) and McCann and Easter (2000) found
transaction costs in the range of 30%-40% of total costs for farmers involved in contracting and technical assistance
schemes; as shown below, these estimates fall within the range of our simulation results across the different scenarios.
14This procedure fits within the broad class of Krinksy-Robb simulation methods to obtain confidence bounds on
derived parameters, with most prominent alternatives in the literature being the Delta method (Bliemer and Rose 2013)
and jackknifing or bootstrapping. While a number of previous studies, following Hu, Veeman, and Adamowicz (2005),
have applied Krinsky-Robb methods to obtain confidence bounds of WTP/WTA in mixed logit models, we extend it
here to obtain confidence bounds around various aggregate outcomes from an agent simulation model.
15Ranges of potential benefits in the central plains were developed for each practice from published estimates, where
benefits include improved water quality, soil productivity, and dust reduction due to reduced soil erosion; soil carbon
sequestration; and improved wildlife habitat. Benefit estimates range from $7 to $54 per enrolled acre per year for
No-till and from $6 to $30 per enrolled acre per year for Filter Strips. The sources and assumptions underlying the
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estimates are described in the supplementary appendix. As another a point of reference, the current payment rates
for Kansas in the Environmental Quality Incentives program (http://www.nrcs.usda.gov/wps/portal/nrcs/
main/ks/programs/financial/eqip) are $9.55 per enrolled acre for No-till and, depending on the type of grass
and land shaping requirements, from $8 to $10.40 per enrolled acre for Filter Strips ($200 to $260 per acre of filter
strip area, which we assume to be 4% of the protected area that is enrolled).
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Table 1: Choice Experiment Attributes and Levels
Attribute Levels Variable
Practice required by contract Filter Strip (no haying/grazing) FSnohay
Filter Strip (with haying/grazing) FShay
Continuous No-till NTcont
Rotational No-till NTrot
Application Time (hours) 4, 16, 24, 40 AppTime
Inspection Probabilitya 0.1, 1 InspectPr
Penalty for Violations ($/acre enrolled)b 50, 100, 250, 500 Penalty
Contract Payment ($/acre enrolled) 3, 7, 15, 25 Payment
a Estimated models used the derived attribute Annual = {0 if InspectPr = 0.1, 1 if InspectPr = 1}
b Estimated models used the derived attribute Epen = InspectPr × Penalty
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Table 2: Sample Summary Statistics
Variable Units Observations Mean Std. Dev.
Stated Choices
Filter Strip Dummy 2177 0.39 0.49
No-till Dummy 2177 0.34 0.48
Do not enroll Dummy 2177 0.27 0.44
Individual Characteristics
Acres owned Acres 135 824 1236
Acres rented Acres 135 804 1342
Male Dummy 134 0.810 0.39
Age Years 135 41.5 15.50
Education Years 97 15.1 2.00
Farming primary occupation Dummy 133 0.58 0.49
Participated in CRPa Dummy 128 0.45 0.50
Participated in EQIPb Dummy 124 0.30 0.46
a CRP = Conservation Reserve Program
b EQIP = Environmental Quality Incentives Program
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Table 3: Estimated Coefficient Means and Dispersions
Point Estimates (Std. Errors) Share with MWTA at
Coefficient Variable Mean Dispersion Coef. < 0 Coef. Means
γ1 FSnohay −0.9762∗∗∗ 1.98129∗∗∗ 68.2% 3.718
(0.25961) (0.28298)
γ2 Fshay −0.38381 2.46883∗∗∗ 56.2% 1.522
(0.28228) (0.29826)
γ3 NTcont −2.37915∗∗∗ 4.07034∗∗∗ 72.1% 9.433
(0.33950) (0.30468)
γ4 NTrot −0.36600 3.00210∗∗∗ 54.9% 1.451
(0.31287) (0.28147)
β1 AppTime −0.04908∗∗∗ 0.05365∗∗∗ 82.0%
(0.00690) (0.00925)
β2 Epen −0.00386∗∗∗ 0.00635∗∗∗ 72.8% 0.015
(0.00079) (0.00118)
β3 Annual 0.70873∗∗∗ 1.15870∗∗∗ 27.0% −2.810
(0.22835) (0.32147)












































































































































































































































































































































































Table 5: Simulated Attribute Profiles
Stringency
Attribute Minimum Low Medium High
AppTime 4 8 16 40
Epen 5 100 250 500















Figure 1: Contract supply and decomposition of aggregate payments
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(a) Supply of no-till contracts, by stringency level           (b) Supply of filter strip contracts, by 
                                                                                                 stringency level 
 
 
         
(c) Payment expenditures, no-till contracts                     (d) Payment expenditures, filter strip contracts 
 
 
          
(e) Information rents and additional                               (f) Information rents and additional  

































































































































































Figure 2: Simulation results
Note: Bar heights in panels (d) - (f) are simulated mean outcomes assuming an enrollment of 50% of eligible acreage






























Figure 3: Simulated compliance frontiers for changes from Minimum stringency to alterna-
tive levels
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